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ABSTRACT 
 
 
        Remote health monitoring has tremendous potential to improve quality of health 
care services in modern and ubiquitous medical environments. It helps to cut the cost in 
modern healthcare by avoiding unnecessary hospital visits for frequent checkups. In this 
context, security and protection of sensitive medical data such as Electronic Health 
Records (EHR), data integrity and protection of patient’s privacy to be monitored are 
important aspects in order to increase user’s acceptance of these new technologies. 
Secure communication protects data from unauthorized users and usually requires pair-
wise keys. In all existing schemes these keys are generated and distributed to nodes 
wishing to communicate. The key generation phase is usually well-secured but the key 
distribution is not, as a result, they are vulnerable to security threats.  
        In this work, we investigate the key distribution problem inside a Body Sensor 
Network (BSN) and present two secure communication schemes which, unlike others, do 
not store a key chain in the memory from a universal key space and eliminate key 
 iv 
broadcast. We have made the key generation phase relatively more secured with the use 
of location information.  
        Authentication of biosensor nodes is also an important issue and has been taken into 
consideration in our schemes. Simulation of our schemes illustrates that they outperform 
some existing schemes and comparatively incurs less transmission and storage cost.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
        Wireless sensor networks (WSN) [1, 2] have made inroads to virtually every corner 
of our life and have received significant attention due to their widespread application in 
civilian and military operations. Recent advances in wireless communication and 
microelectronics have led to the development of low-cost and low-power sensor nodes. 
Sensors are inexpensive, low-power devices which have limited resources [2]. They are 
small in size, and have wireless communication capability within short distances. A 
sensor node typically contains a power unit, a sensing unit, a processing unit, a storage 
unit, and a wireless transmitter / receiver. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed 
of large number of sensor nodes with limited power, computation, storage and 
communication capabilities. Characteristics of a sensor network include flexibility in 
operation, high sensing fidelity, rapid and easy deployment, fault tolerance, low cost, 
dynamic changes and low maintenance.  
        Sensor networks have many applications in many fields, from medicine to military 
to inventory control. Some of the prominent applications in sensor network include:  
• Traffic monitoring system: Traffic monitoring system monitors vehicle traffic on 
a highway, freeway or in a congested city area and provides information 
regarding accidents or traffic jams. 
• Parking Monitoring System: Parking monitoring system provides identification of 
unoccupied parking spaces in busy city areas. 
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• Environment Monitoring System: An environment monitoring system detects and 
monitors environmental changes such as drought, floods and forest fires. It can 
also provide security in a shopping mall, parking garage, or other facilities. 
• Battlefield Monitoring System: Battlefield monitoring system tracks enemy 
movements and deployments.  
• Patient monitoring system: Inside a patient monitoring system biosensors or IMDs 
embedded in human body monitors blood pressure, body temperature, sugar level, 
heart beats etc.  
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks and Pervasive Healthcare 
        Since early 21st century, security and privacy [3, 4] in wireless sensor network has 
been an active field of research. Development of a robust security scheme is challenged 
by the limited capabilities of a sensor in terms of storage, processing power and energy. 
In today’s modern and ubiquitous computing environments, it is important more than 
ever the necessity for deployment of pervasive healthcare architectures into which the 
patient is the central point who is surrounded by different types of small and embedded 
computing devices. These devices measures sensitive patient’s medical data, physical 
indications and interacts with hospitals databases and therefore if required allows urgent 
medical response during emergencies and other critical situations. These environments 
should be developed incorporating the fundamental security requirements for real-time 
secure data communication, protection and confidentiality of sensitive medical data and 
measurements, data integrity and protection of the privacy of the patient being monitored. 
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1.2 Biomedical sensors or Intelligent Medical Devices (IMD) 
        Biomedical sensors take signals representing biomedical variables and convert them 
into an electrical signal. So it acts as an interface between a biologic and electronic 
signal.Biomedical sensors are classified into physical sensors and chemical sensors. 
Many different types of sensors are used in biomedical applications and are classified in 
Table 1.  
Table 1. Characterization of Biomedical sensors 
Physical Sensors Chemical Sensors 
Geometric Gas 
Mechanical Electrochemical 
Thermal Photometric 
Electric 
Optical 
Other physical chemical 
methods 
Hydraulic Bioanalytic 
         
Physical sensors measures muscle displacement, body temperature, blood pressure and 
flow, cerebrospiral fluid pressure, bone growth and density etc. While chemical sensors 
measures and detects chemical quantities by identifying the presence of compounds and 
monitors chemical activities in the body. 
1.3 Need for Security in Pervasive Health Care 
        Medical information security of a pervasive health care system is very important as it 
is in any information system. In recent years EHRs have become more computerized and 
integrated among various healthcare providers. According to ISO, EHR (Electronic 
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Health Record) is any repository of patient data in digital form, stored and exchanged 
securely and accessible by authorized users. EHR is used in primary, secondary and 
tertiary health care by the staff of a general practice, a specialist facility upon referred by 
a primary care physician and by a team of specialists in a major hospital respectively.  
        Security is an important factor in medicine and health care [6] since patient’s 
medical records must remain private. Inside a typical Body Sensor Network or Body 
Area Network (BSN-BAN) a biosensor or an IMD (Intelligent Medical Devices) gather 
sensitive medical information from a patient’s body for transmission to a hospital and 
also provides medical services such as drug delivery or prosthetics to the patient being 
monitored. In accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996(HIPAA) all hospitals and clinical settings must ensure secrecy and privacy [8] of 
patients’ medical information. Therefore any BSN-BAN which senses and measures 
various body parameters needs to ensure that the patient’s medical data is never leaked or 
provided to unauthorized entities, either during the sensing or communication process.  
        A possible breach in security inside a BSN-BAN can lead a malicious entity to 
disguise as the controlling base-station and inject unwanted, false medical instructions 
such as a drug administration leading to catastrophic results such as patients’ death. It is 
always a challenge to provide security in BSN-BAN. One reason is the wireless nature of 
the whole set up. Biosensors communicate between themselves and the base station using 
wireless communication so an eavesdropper can always listen to this communication, 
insert bogus messages or jam the communication. Another reason is the limited capability 
of biosensors such as reduced processing power and battery life. So the traditional 
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cryptographic algorithms cannot be used to secure the communication between these 
devices. 
There are many security issues [3, 4, 5] regarding WSN-BSN-BAN. 
• Sensor node compromise: This involves attacking, capturing and 
reprogramming a sensor node. Once attacker captures a few nodes, a variety of 
attacks are mounted by the adversary such as distortion of sensor data, exhausting 
the network by creating false routing loops and extracting secure information.  
• Eavesdropping: Eavesdropping can be done where an adversary monitors 
transmissions of communication between nodes and gains important information. 
• Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: DoS attacks aim to destroy network 
functionality rather than subverting it or using the sensed information and are 
extremely difficult to defend. Potential defenses against DoS attacks are as varied 
as the attacks themselves.  
• Malicious use of commodity networks: The use of sensor networks will 
inevitably extend to criminals who can use them for illegal purposes. With 
widespread use, the cost and availability barriers that discourage such attacks will 
drop. 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
In this thesis the secure communication between biosensors are divided into three phases: 
initialization or set up phase, secure key generation phase and medical data 
communication phase. In our two schemes the biosensor nodes communicate with the 
parent node or head node H inside the BSN-BAN with wireless link. We have followed a 
centralized approach for our a) Location-dependent Hash (LH) chain based scheme and a 
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distributed approach (b) Location-dependent Non Hash (LNH) chain scheme. The two 
schemes proposed are analyzed and the comparisons with other similar schemes are 
presented along with the result of their implementation. 
        The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the preliminaries for the 
research. Chapter 3 presents our problem statement, followed by the description of our 
protocols in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the mathematical analysis of the protocols, 
implementation results and security analysis. Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and 
future work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
PRELIMINARIES 
2.1 Evolution of Pervasive Health Management  
        Pervasive Health Management (PHM) mainly involves round-the-clock monitoring 
and collecting vital health information like pulse, temperature, blood pressure, blood 
glucose level, respiratory function and a variety of other physiological metrics with the 
help of portable biomedical devices and other Intelligent Medical Devices (IMD). This 
real time information may then be sent to health agencies and health practitioners for 
further analysis. This not only helps in self managing various chronic diseases like Heart 
Diseases, Asthma, Diabetes, etc, but also in preventive healthcare for persons of all ages.  
So far PHM has evolved in three stages till now [7]: 
• The Stand-alone health monitors [8] are used to take readings manually and then 
stored manually or electronically. 
• Hospital and Home based Tele-health monitors that capture data from wired 
medical devices that are wired to or around patient’s body and transfer it to 
backend servers via landline phones. 
• Pervasive Healthcare Management where a cell phone or PDA directly gathers or 
captures data 24/7 from various wireless biomedical sensors attached to human 
body and transfers them to backend servers wirelessly to be further processed for 
diagnosis and appropriate action. This is easier to use as the entire system is 
wireless and mobile.  
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        PHM creates a win-win situation for everybody like patient, doctor, pharmaceutical 
companies, hospital and insurance agencies. A patient has peace of mind by being 
silently monitored all the time. Medical units such as doctors, specialists and nurses can 
be reached anywhere anytime who can diagnose and provide accurate medical advice 
since they have access to real time medical records. Hospital and pharmaceutical 
companies can extend their health care management programs effectively and insurance 
companies will save significant funds with reduced number of hospitalizations. 
Today’s social conditions are perfect for pervasive health monitoring because of high 
growth of chronic diseases and aged population, better penetration of mobile phone 
industry, and due to high medical expenses in hospitals. The market surveys have already 
shown that the costs with pervasive monitoring are several times less than the cost of 
monitoring at hospitals. Here is an example to further illustrate the advantage that 
involves symptoms common to the world population.  
Example 1: Emily is a 15 year old who has just been diagnosed with juvenile diabetes. 
She uses a glucose meter and cell phone to monitor her blood sugar levels. The cell 
phone reminds Emily to check her blood sugar regularly during the day, and her glucose 
meter seamlessly transmits the measurements to his cell phone after each use. The data is 
transferred to a diabetic monitoring service that maintains Emily’s long-term history and 
looks for abnormal events. If a reading is unusual, or if Emily skips a test, the system 
automatically contacts her parents/relatives, who can get in touch with her immediately.  
2.2. Features of Pervasive Health Management  
PHM has the following features: 
• Pervasive health care is available anytime and anywhere.  
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• Disease monitoring 24/7 using wireless biomedical sensors. 
• Medical data can be transferred for evaluation to a medical call center round-the-
clock and feedbacks are given to patients or action is taken immediately in case of 
emergency.  
• Data is stored in patient’s medical history in the form of Electronic Health Record 
(EHR). 
• For further analysis EHR can be sent to doctor / specialist in a hospital by email, 
fax, or on mobile on real time basis and remote consultations can be provided 
using e-mail, text, chat and video conferencing . 
• Trend analysis and alerts can be provided to patients for overall improved disease 
management leading to greater life expectancy. 
2.3. Socio-economic Reasons for PHM 
        In 2008, total healthcare spending in the USA reached $2.3 trillion which was 16% 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) [9]. In 2009, 145 million people or almost half of all 
Americans lived with a chronic condition [10]. In 2009, United States spent 85 percent of 
the health care cost on people with chronic conditions. Figure 1 shows information about 
US population with one or more chronic diseases [11]. 
By 2015, U.S. healthcare spending is expected to increase to $4.4 trillion, or 20% of 
GDP. Industry experts agree that the U.S. healthcare system is plagued with excessive 
administrative expenses, inefficiencies and inappropriate measures. These problems 
significantly increase the cost of medical care and health insurance for employers and 
consumers. 
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Figure 1. US population (in millions) with one or more chronic diseases. 
        In the year 2009, data from Center for Disease Control [12] show the observation on 
physician visits as given in Table 2. Based on the table we can infer that approximately 
441.98 million visits were made to primary care physicians only for the purpose of 
performing general medical examination. A pervasive health monitoring system is 
expected to almost eliminate visits to a physician for general medical examination as the 
system monitors medical data round-the-clock, issues alerts in case of an emergency and 
recommends appropriate action. Assuming an average cost of $100 per visit translates to 
saving of approximately $ 44.19 billion in hospitals visits only. If we consider all the 
savings from hospital, pharmaceutical and insurance companies, the total costs savings 
will be much more significant.  
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Table 2. Physician visits observation data, 2009 
Number of visits to a physician in USA 902 million 
Number of visits to a physician per 100 persons 306.6  
Percent of visits made to primary care physicians 49 per cent 
Most frequent reason for visit general medical 
examination 
Average cost of hospital visit  $100.00 
Approximate total savings to US healthcare using PHM  $ 44.19 billion 
 
With researches predicting a shortage of 35,000 to 44,000 primary care physicians in the 
USA by 2025 [13] and approximately 0.8 million shortage of nurses (Figure 2) by 2020 
[14], mobile health monitoring is going to get significant attention in healthcare 
management.     
 
Figure 2. Demand and supply of nurses (in millions) 
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CHAPTER 3 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
3.1 Problem Specification 
        Many applications in BSN-BAN involve secure communication among large 
numbers of wireless sensor devices. In order to protect sensitive medical data and sensor 
readings pair-wise keys should be used for encryption. In all existing schemes these keys 
are generated and distributed to nodes wishing to communicate. The key generation 
phase is usually well-secured because it is completed at system setup time, but the key 
distribution is vulnerable to security threats. The idea of key broadcast seems useful; 
however, in reality it is fairly unreliable [19], especially for devices with IEEE 802.15.4 
radio packets, a de facto standard in WSN [2]. While the maximum broadcast packet size 
is a few kilobytes of payload, an individual 802.15.4 radio packet can carry a maximum 
of 128 bytes of data and this mode is inherently unreliable because the list of recipients is 
unknown. Datagrams broken into three or more fragments (over 200 bytes of payload) 
are almost likely to experience some loss.  If that happens then the lost data must be 
retransmitted, and if required, may have to be fragmented and defragmented again, 
leading to further data loss and increased power consumption [25]. It is all the more 
important that the loss of data which is actually medical data in our case remains 
minimum or zero. Hence, schemes that transfer packets with subset of keys may lose a 
portion of data as they would be fragmented during broadcast. Important data should 
generally be transferred in unicast mode via radiograms or radio streams. For these 
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reasons we took a different approach for generating and using the keys for 
communication instead of distributing them to nodes wishing to communicate.   
3.2 List of Possible Attacks 
        We have divided the possibility of attacks in a pervasive health care set up into 
patient’s side and the caregiver side. Here is the list of some of the possible security 
issues. 
Patient’s Side: 
• Probing attacks, tampering attacks by malicious users that have explicit 
interference and physical access to an IMD or a biosensor. A malicious node can 
prevent a legitimate warning generated by an IMD or a biosensor from reaching 
the appropriate authorities. Also it can generate a false warning for a patient 
leading to unwanted actions such as false diagnosis or a wrong drug delivery. This 
is a form of Active attack. 
• Attacks in the form of eavesdropping by a malicious node into the communication 
link between an IMD and other systems. This is a form of passive attack. 
• A malicious node can take advantage of the fact that biosensor devices are 
resource constrained and therefore can generate bogus messages inside the 
network leading to wastage of much needed battery life.  
• The biosensors are implanted or attached to patient’s body so another side effect 
of “overworking of biosensor nodes” is the problem of tissue heating. Due to 
prolonged exposure to abnormal temperatures can cause tissue degeneration 
leading to severe health problems such as leukemia. 
• Attacks can also be made by insiders such as patient reporting false medical data. 
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Severe security lapses can occur at the Caregiver Side too such as: 
• Security breach because of granting system access to improper persons, “who gets 
access to what”. 
• Security breach because of not revoking terminated employee’s access that are 
fired or retired. 
• Security breach due to common errors such as “Mailbox Full” and important 
medical messages not getting delivered to required persons. 
• Security breach due to improper configuration of hardware and software being 
used, “never trust on defaults”. 
• Security breach due to Group Activities using a Group Login. Activities cannot be 
monitored in situations where a common login is being used to monitor a patient’s 
medical information by a group of doctors and nurses.  
• Security breach due to improper training. 
• Security breach due to workstations not getting automatically locked when no one 
is around. 
3.3 Related Work   
        Several works have discussed the problem of devising a secure mechanism for key 
generation and distribution [3, 15, 19, 20, 21, 30, 31]. Eschenauer and Gligor [16] 
proposed a probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme for pairwise key establishment. The 
main idea of this scheme was to let each sensor node randomly pick a set of keys from a 
universal key pool before deployment so that any two sensor nodes must have a certain 
probability of sharing at least one common key. We call this as the basic probabilistic key 
pre-distribution scheme or EG scheme. Chan et al. [17] further extended this idea and 
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developed two key pre-distribution techniques (a) q-composite key pre-distribution and 
(b) random pairwise keys scheme.  
        The q-composite key pre-distribution uses a key pool but requires two sensors to 
compute a pair-wise key from at least q pre-distributed keys which they share. This 
approach increases the amount of key overlap required for key-setup. Further, to preserve 
the probability of two nodes sharing sufficient keys to establish a secure link, it is 
necessary to reduce the size of the key pool.  As a result, a small number of compromised 
nodes may affect a large fraction of pair-wise keys. The random pair-wise keys scheme 
randomly picks pairs of sensors and assigns each pair a unique random key. Both 
schemes although improve the security over the basic probabilistic key pre-distribution 
scheme, the pair-wise key establishment problem remains unsolved. In the basic 
probabilistic and the q-composite key pre-distribution schemes, as the number of 
compromised nodes increases, the fraction of affected pair-wise keys increases quickly. 
Although the random pair-wise keys scheme does not suffer from the above security 
problem, due to memory constraint nature of sensor nodes, the network size remains 
small. 
        Perrig et al. [5] proposed SPINS, a security architecture specifically designed for 
sensor networks. In this scheme each sensor node shares a common key with the base 
station. The base station acts as a trusted third party when two nodes establish a new key. 
Having base station as a mediator for new key generation is costly because of increased 
communication overhead. 
        Das et al. [30, 32] proposed a scheme which is an extension of Dong and Liu’s 
scheme. The main idea is to deploy a small number of High end sensors (H-sensors) 
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together with a large number of Low end sensors (L-sensors). Before deployment the set 
up server stores ids, master keys, n key plus id combination KHi, uj, iduj (key and id 
combination of H and L sensors respectively) and the polynomial share (Blundo and 
Santis, 1993) of all H sensor into each H sensor. Also each L sensor are loaded with its 
own id, master key and l key plus id combination Ku, vj = PRF MKvj(idu) where u and v are L 
sensors, MKvj is the master key of any sensor vj and idu is the id of sensor u. For common 
pairwise key generation, H and L sensor will broadcast their ids to check whether the key 
ring of them contain the id of another node. If the id is found in its memory then the 
associated key becomes the secret pairwise key. 
        Du et al. [31] proposed a symmetric pre distribution (AP) key management scheme. 
Here in this scheme each L sensor is preloaded with l keys and H sensor are loaded with 
M keys where M >> l. For distributed pairwise key distribution each L sensor broadcasts 
its key ids associated with the keys from its key ring to discover if they share a common 
key. For centralized pairwise key distribution each L sensors broadcasts its key ids to its 
cluster heads (H). The key discovery is done by H as it has all the information in its 
memory so it can determine if two L sensors u and v are neighbors based on their location 
proximity and then a common key is allocated to each pair of neighboring L sensors. The 
approach is very similar to other pairwise key distribution schemes. This scheme suffers 
from cost overhead due to message transmission during pairwise key generation.  
        Recently location information [27, 33, 34] of sensor nodes has been used for key 
distributions. Liu and Ning [23, 24] proposed closest pairwise key scheme (CPKS) and 
closest polynomial key scheme (CPPS) for key generation and distribution. It is an 
extended version of random pair-wise key scheme. The main idea here is to have prior 
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deployment knowledge of the deployed sensor nodes. Here each sensor node share 
pairwise key with its n closest neighbors. The schemes lose their performance as the 
deployment error between actual and expected locations of the deployed sensor nodes 
increases. Das [34] extended the idea of Liu and Ning by proposing ECPKS (enhanced 
closest pairwise keys scheme). ECPKS used both pre deployment as well as post 
deployment knowledge for key pre distribution mechanisms.  
        Authentication of sensor node is also a major area of research while developing 
schemes for key generation and distribution. Perrig et al. developed a protocol named 
µTESLA [4] for broadcast authentication in distributed sensor networks. This protocol is 
a modified form of stream authentication protocol called TESLA [5]. µTESLA protocol 
uses a serial chain of authentication keys which are linked to each other by a pseudo 
random function [22]. This pseudo random function is a one way function. It achieves 
authentication by delayed key disclosure in the key chain. Liu et al. [23, 24] proposed a 
modified form of µTESLA. The main idea was to predetermine and then broadcast the 
key chain commitments instead of message transmission.  
        Zhang et al. [26] proposed a node-to-node neighborhood authentication scheme 
using LBKs (Location-based Keys). In this scheme each node has to broadcast its 
location to its neighboring nodes for authentication. Broadcasting of confidential entities 
such as location information possesses a security risk as discussed above. 
3.4 Thesis Approach  
        Here we are proposing a pervasive health care system where our schemes can be 
implemented inside the BSN-BAN. Pervasive health care systems provide medical units 
specially doctors and nurses at a hospital with remote access to real-time patient’s health 
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data. The whole medical system (figure 3) runs a large diversity of applications which 
consists of setting up communications among various implantable medical devices 
(IMDs) such as sensors, actuators and smart hand held portable devices (PDAs). 
Collection of medical data is done inside the BSN and then it is further integrated with 
patient’s EHR through communication channels such as internet and other asynchronous 
transfer through cellular network. The messages and medical records are further 
processed and accessed by authorized doctors and specialized medical personnel on 
demand to give care and treatment to the patients. 
 
 
    Figure 3.  High level view of a pervasive health care architecture. 
        Inside the pervasive healthcare environment, resource-constraint BSN-BAN needs 
data transmission scheme that requires minimal cost in terms of memory and power 
usage. A typical sensor node when idle consumes less than 100 µwatts of power. A 
significant portion of power is used in data transmission with devices having data transfer 
speed of 10-250 kbps consuming about 30-40 mW of power. In several prominent key 
distribution schemes for BSN, data transmission involves broadcast of a subset of keys 
from a key pool. While broadcast involving IEEE 802.15.4 devices are unreliable as 
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indicated above, multiple broadcasts results in significant consumption of power. Also, as 
the size of program memory of a typical sensor may range from 4-128 kilobytes, storing a 
large subset of key ring sizes (in order of few hundreds) as discussed above may involve 
use of a significant portion of overall program memory. We present two schemes that 
eliminate the key distribution phase in setting up secured communication among sensor 
nodes. Thus, unlike most other schemes our schemes do not require sensor nodes to store 
a key chain in memory from a universal key space and broadcast them to other nodes. 
Instead, the individual and common pair wise keys are generated and undergo unicast in 
the network. We have exploited the strength of location information (x’ and y’ 
coordinates) in developing our scheme. An x’/y’ value is unique and cannot be hacked 
without being identified. 
        BSN-BAN environment can be indoor or outdoor. For outdoor localization GPS is 
the most favored and used technology. But for indoor which is actually the environment 
for pervasive health care networks GPS technology is not feasible. Several indoor 
localization schemes have been proposed. For our set up we are using RFID tag based 
indoor localization mechanism [18]. In our schemes the sensor nodes communicate with 
the parent node or head node H inside the BSN-BAN with wireless link. We present (a) 
Location-dependent Hash (LH) chain based scheme and (b) Location-dependent Non 
Hash (LNH) chain scheme. The first scheme creates several hash chains and involves 
more computation for the head node. The second scheme does not create hash chains but 
involves more data storage in the head node.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
4.1 The Implementation  
        In this work, we investigate the key distribution problem in body area networks and 
present two secure communication schemes which, unlike others, do not store a key chain 
in the memory from a universal key space and eliminate key broadcast. We have made 
the key generation phase relatively more secured with the use of location information. 
Authentication of sensor devices is also an important issue and has been taken into 
consideration in our schemes. Simulation of our schemes illustrates that they outperform 
some existing schemes and comparatively incurs less transmission and storage cost. Here 
is our software architecture in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Software Architecture 
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4.2 Location-Based Hash (LH) Chain Scheme 
        This scheme uses location information (x’ and y’ coordinates) of sensor nodes first 
to generate the individual key sets which are then used to generate the common pairwise 
key between any two sensor nodes wishing to communicate. This approach makes sure 
that no two sensor nodes can have any keys in common. 
        The pairwise key generation scheme is divided into two steps: (a) deployment of 
sensors and individual key generation by nodes using (x’/y’) and (b) authentication of 
sensor nodes and generation of pair wise key. Table 3 shows the notations we have used 
to describe the schemes. 
Table 3. Notations Used in the Schemes 
Notation Meaning 
A, B Communicating Nodes. 
H Head node of a cluster. 
IDA , IDB Identifier of node A and B 
KA1…. KA3 Key set for A generated by hash chain. 
KB1……KB3 Key set for B generated by hash chain. 
KAB Common pairwise key for A & B. 
LatH Location information of head node, x’ in this case 
LatA Location information of node A, x’ in this case 
KA,KB Individual keys of node A and B respectively 
LOCA Location information of node A, x’/ y’ coordinate 
LOCB Location information of node B, x’/ y’ coordinate  
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4.2.1 Sensors Deployment and Hash Chain Formations  
        In this step the key is generated after deploying the sensors and forming the clusters. 
We can safely assume that this initial setup securely saves sensor ID together with 
location information (X’/Y’) of all nodes in each head node prior to key generation and 
each sensor devices are capable of determining its location information using RFID tag 
based indoor localization mechanism [18] so the y can uniquely determine their own 
location. The scheme involves creating one way hash chains by hashing the location 
information to generate individual keys for each sensor nodes. All hash chains are 
generated using hash functions starting from the head node of a cluster. Figure 5 shows 
our scheme of using location information in hash chains to generate individual key rings. 
For simplicity we have consider x’= LAT (latitude information) and y’=LON (longitude 
information) or vice versa wherever required. 
 
Figure 5. Hashing of Location Information for individual key generation 
        Thus, using a hash function h the head node (H) generates a hash value KH = h(LatH) 
by hashing its location information (x’ and y’ coordinates). It passes this hash value to the 
next neighboring node A which in turn generates KA (key of A) by computing the hash of 
sum of KH and its location information, LatA which is KA= h(KH+LatA). Next, node A 
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sends KA to its adjacent node and thus the individual key generation continues until the 
last node of the cluster has generated its key. In our scheme we require three keys in the 
key ring set of each sensor node which can be generated using x’, y’ and both. In the 
example above we have used the x’ coordinate for generating these keys. It can be argued 
that two or more sensor nodes can have either x’ or y’ coordinate information same but it 
is impossible for both x’ and y’ information of one sensor node matching with another 
sensor node. So even if one of the individual keys out of three keys is same between two 
or more sensor node due to the same x’ or y’ information still the pairwise key will be 
different as it is generated using all the three keys in the key ring set.  
        Since key generation is hash chain based, head node has the ability to generate 
individual keys for any node in its cluster as it knows the location of all the nodes in its 
cluster. The head node uses this concept later in the pair wise key generation mechanism. 
No sensor node of the cluster can generate individual keys of any other sensor node 
because they do not have the location information of any other node. Hash chains are 
lightweight cryptographic elements and are suitable for applications in WSN and they 
have the following properties:  
• For a given cryptographic hash function h and an input string S, it is easy to 
calculate h(S) but not possible to retrieve S from h(S). Since cryptographic hash 
functions are one-way, it is also not possible to compute h-1
 
where h(h-1(S))= h(S).  
• The hash function h has collision resistant property which means it is not possible 
to find two strings S and S’ such that h(S) = h(S’).  
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4.2.2 Authentication of Sensor Nodes and Secure Pairwise Key Generation  
        We consider two sensor nodes A and B with identities IDA and IDB respectively in 
the same cluster and show how pairwise keys for them are generated (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  LH Scheme 
        Suppose A has KA1, KA2 and KA3 and B has KB1, KB2 and KB3. These individual keys 
have been generated by the three hash chains discussed above. If node A wants to 
communicate with node B, it will require a symmetric pair wise key. The pair wise key 
generation starts by A sending its IDA and an encrypted message EKA1 to H. EKA1 contains 
3 entities: (a) two of the three individual keys of A chosen randomly and (b) the identifier 
IDB of B. EKA1 is a message encrypted using the individual key of A (e.g., KA1) and hence 
this key, KA1, is not included in the message. A sends this encrypted message EKA1 to H 
requesting a common pairwise key, KAB, for communication.  
        The head node H checks the authenticity of these two nodes before it generates the 
pairwise key for A and B. H checks the identifier of A and initially assumes that A is a 
local node of the cluster. Since all the keys of A were earlier generated by using a hash 
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chain starting from H, it can re-hash multiple times and calculate all the three keys of A. 
It decrypts EKA1 (by applying the three keys of A using trial and error method) and get 
two keys of A in the message. The head node authenticates A if two of the three generated 
keys match with the key pair in the message. H also knows that A wants to communicate 
with B (the encrypted message sent by A to the head node includes the identifier of the 
node it wants to communicate with) so it generates the individual keys of B using hash 
chain and stores it into its memory together with the individual keys of A. H authenticates 
node B next.  It sends an encrypted message EKB1 to node B requesting its ID information 
and the other two keys of node B. Node B decrypt this message EKB1(by applying its three 
keys one by one using trial and error method). Node B sends back EKB1 (encrypted 
message containing IDB and two other keys of B, say KB2 and KB3). After receiving this 
information from node B, H decrypts the message and matches this information with the 
previously stored information of node B (IDB) and the keys KB2 and KB3. The 
authentication of node B ends successfully if the information matches.  In the event of 
information mismatch, H may declare B as malicious and quarantine it from the rest of 
the cluster. 
        After a successful authentication of nodes A and B the common pairwise key 
generation starts. H randomly selects the individual keys of A and B (say KA1 KA2 KB2 
KB3) and generate KAB = KA1⊕KA2⊕KB2⊕KB3 (Common key for A & B generated by 
XORing). H sends KAB and IDB to node A by encrypting it with KA1 and KAB and IDA to 
node B by encrypting it with KB1. Nodes A and B will decrypt this common pairwise key 
and ID information by using their respective keys KA1 and KB1. Node A understands that 
this pairwise key is to communicate with a node in its cluster with identifier IDB. 
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Similarly, node B understands that this pairwise key is to communicate with a node in its 
cluster with identifier IDA. The algorithm for pair wise key generation is summarized 
below: 
a. Node A sends its IDA and an encrypted message EKA1 (containing two randomly 
chosen keys of A and IDB) to H requesting a pairwise key KAB. The message is 
encrypted using one of the keys of A, say KA1. 
b. H decrypts the message using key KA1 (it can generate all the three keys of A using 
hash chain) and verifies node A is an authenticate node. It also generates the three 
individual keys of B. 
c. H sends an encrypted message EKB1 to node B requesting its ID information and 
the other two keys of node B. 
d. B decrypts this message EKB1 using KB1 and sends back an encrypted message 
EKB1 (containing IDB and two other keys of B say KB2 and KB3). The message is 
encrypted using one of the keys of B, say KB1.  
e. H decrypts this message using key KB1 and authenticates B. 
f. H generates common pairwise key KAB by XORing the randomly chosen keys of A 
and B. (KAB = KA1⊕ KA2 ⊕ KB2 ⊕ KB3). 
g. H sends the common pairwise key KAB and IDB to node A by encrypting it with 
KA1. 
h. H sends the common pairwise key KAB and IDA to node B by encrypting it with 
KB1. 
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        Node A and B decrypt the messages sent by H using their keys KA1 and KB1 
respectively to recover
 
KAB. Node A and B may now communicate with each other using 
the common symmetric key. 
        In our scheme we have considered a scenario where two sensor nodes require 
common pairwise key from H before they can communicate. H authenticates these nodes 
before sending the common pair wise keys. In some scenarios a sensor node may try to 
communicate with many other sensor nodes, as a result, H may end up authenticating the 
sender node as many number of time as the number of nodes it want to communicate 
(multiple authentication) within a very short interval. This will incur significant 
processing cost which will vary with the size of the network and traffic leading to 
significant communication delay. We are actively investigating this issue we will report 
our remedy in our future work. 
4.3 Location-Based Non Hash (LNH) Chain Scheme:  
        In our previous scheme (LH), the key generation and distribution is somewhat 
centralized. The individual key generation and later distribution of pairwise key is 
initiated by H inside the cluster. After the pair wise key has been generated H does not 
play any significant role. In our second scheme (LNH), the common pair wise key is 
generated by individual sensor nodes with some assistant from H. Thus, the pair wise key 
generation in this scheme is distributed. Unlike LH scheme here H does not generate pair 
wise key but acts as a third party in key generation. The dependency of H in common pair 
wise key generation in LNH scheme is less than that of LH scheme. Use of both schemes 
can vary depending upon the cluster size. Implementing hash chain based LH scheme for 
huge clusters can be sometimes tedious but it is more secure compared to LNH scheme 
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which can work well if the cluster size is bigger as it is simpler to implement. Figure 7 
shows the operations of our LNH scheme.  
4.3.1 Sensor Node Deployment and Secure Key Generation 
        In this scheme every node inside a cluster has a unique key which is stored in them 
prior to deployment. During deployment, the location information, sensor Id, and the 
unique individual keys of every sensor nodes are stored into H in a secure manner.  
 
Figure 7.  LNH Scheme 
        Similar to the LH scheme, we use location information of two sensor nodes wishing 
to communicate as a parameter to generate common pairwise keys. Two nodes (say A 
and B) wishing to communicate will require a common pairwise key, KAB. The individual 
keys of these sensor nodes are KA and KB. Node A will send its sensor ID and an 
encrypted message EKA to H. This message contains a request for the location information 
of node B. H receives the request and sends an encrypted message EKB (containing IDA) 
to B requesting its location information. 
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        This message is an indication that Node A intends to communicate with B and hence 
B needs to send its location information to H. Node B will send its sensor ID and an 
encrypted message EKB to H requesting node A’s location information. H will identify 
node A and B by their IDs and can decrypt messages sent by them. As H has all the 
location information of the sensor nodes in its cluster, it sends the location information of 
node B to node A and vice versa by encrypting it with their individual keys. On receiving 
the location information from H, A and B will generate the common pairwise key KAB 
(LatA ⊕ LonA ⊕ LatB ⊕ LonB) by XORing location information. Unlike the previous 
scheme, the head node does not generate the pair wise key. It only acts as a third party in 
key generation.  
        All the communications done in this scheme are in encrypted form and hence cannot 
be eavesdropped. The scheme also does not require storing huge key sets in a sensor 
node. The mechanism is although lightweight but quite secured. The algorithm for pair 
wise key generation is summarized below: 
a. Node A sends its IDA and an encrypted message EKA (requesting the location 
information of node B) to Head node H
. 
The message is encrypted using the key 
of A, say KA.  
b. H receives the request and sends an encrypted message EKB (containing IDA) to B 
requesting its location information. This message is an indication that A intends to 
communicate with B and hence B needs to send its location information to H. 
c. Node B sends its IDB and an encrypted message EKB (requesting the location 
information of node A) to H
. 
The message is encrypted using the key of B, say KB. 
d. Node H decrypts the messages from A and B using key KA and KB. 
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e. Node H sends an encrypted message EKA to node A containing node B’s location 
information and an encrypted message EKB to node B containing node A’s location 
information. 
f. Node A and B decrypt these messages and generate the common pairwise key KAB 
by XORing of location information.
 
(KAB = LatA ⊕ LonA ⊕ LatB ⊕ LonB)   
Node A and B may now begin communication using this common pairwise key KAB. 
4.4 Strengths of Our Schemes as Compared to Other Existing Schemes 
        Unlike some other schemes developed earlier, our LH and LNH schemes are 
although lightweight but very effective as discussed below: 
• Unlike most other schemes, ours do not require broadcasting of a subset of 
keys.  
• Our schemes do not require storing large amount of information (for example, 
a subset of keys) inside a sensor node (except the head node) to compose a 
common pair wise key. This saves significant number of transmissions 
between nodes and storage space. 
• No major calculations other than hash chain generation (which are lightweight 
cryptographic functions) are needed to generate pair wise keys. 
• In our schemes we have used location information of sensor nodes for key 
generation. Location information is a metric unique to each sensor node. No 
two sensor nodes can have the same location. Also, it is not possible to find the 
location of a sensor node using the location of another sensor node. This means 
even if one node is compromised, the other nodes remain safe. 
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• Our schemes have a mechanism for authenticating sensor nodes before 
common pair wise keys between two sensor nodes can be generated. In this 
way, malicious sensor nodes can be identified easily within the cluster and H 
can take appropriate action. 
• Our schemes perform well irrespective of cluster size. This is because there is 
less communications among nodes which is less susceptible to eavesdropping. 
• Our schemes are robust and in the event of an eavesdropping, the encrypted 
messages cannot be decrypted as the intruder will not have the individual keys 
of a node. We assume that head nodes in our network are tamper resistant 
devices and cannot be compromised.  Even if the intruder compromises other 
sensor nodes, it will not be able to generate individual keys of those nodes 
(since they are created using one way hash chains starting from the head node). 
• The proposed schemes always guarantees that no matter how many regular 
sensor devices are compromised, the other non compromised devices can still 
communicate with 100% secrecy. The proposed schemes are always 
unconditionally secure against node capture attacks.  
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CHAPTER 5 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
        We evaluated LH and LNH schemes with the EG scheme, Q-Composite scheme, 
Random Pairwise scheme, AP scheme, ECPKS scheme, USKS scheme, CPPS and CPKS 
scheme. As discussed above that key-distribution in broadcast based schemes are 
vulnerable and it is costly to maintain security. The above mentioned schemes broadcast 
their key or polynomial sets for pairwise key generation. Broadcasting keys is more 
costly in terms of processing power and battery life as a large portion of power is used in 
data transmission.  
        To avoid an increase in computational, power consumption and storage cost, unlike 
other schemes  our schemes (LH and LNH) avoids key broadcast during common 
pairwise key generation process and therefore we expect our schemes to be more energy 
efficient as shown below. In our experiment we compared the total data transmitted in all 
the above schemes and total storage required in a sensor node during the pair wise key 
generation process.  The schemes are evaluated assuming networks of all sizes. We 
initially assumed a network of 100 nodes in a cluster and increase the size by 100 nodes. 
The size of a key is assumed to be 128 bits. Interference is common in 2.4 GHz band. 
IEEE 802.15.4 applications (sensor nodes) have low quality of service requirements and 
may need to perform multiple retries for packet transmissions. This is especially true for 
data broadcast of key rings in a sensor network which may significantly affect the 
transmission cost between sensor nodes. To avoid complicated scenarios of significant 
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rebroadcast of keys in a sensor network due to loss of data, we assumed that all schemes 
are able to broadcast their keys with minimum retransmissions.  
5.1 Power Consumption Analysis 
 
Figure 8.  Comparison of Data Transmission in EG, Random pairwise, Q-Composite, AP 
with LH and LNH 
        Figure 8 and 9 show the result of our simulation comparing transmission cost 
between various other schemes. X axis denotes number of nodes. In Figure 8, for the sake 
of clarity and due to large values of y, we show the transmission cost in kilobytes using 
logarithm scale. Here Figure 8 shows that transmission cost of EG scheme is significantly 
higher than Q-composite and Random pairwise scheme. AP scheme works better than the 
above mentioned scheme even with increased number of nodes. Due to unicast 
transmissions for pairwise key generation, both of our schemes (LH and LNH) have 
relatively lower cost as compared to other schemes. 
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Figure 9. Comparison of Data Transmission in ECPKS, USKS with LH and LNH 
        Figure 9 shows the comparison of LH and LNH schemes with ECPKS and USKS 
schemes. ECPKS scheme stores higher number of keys inside sensor memory during key 
prioritization phase. After key prioritization only highest priority keys are kept and rest is 
discarded. In comparison to USKS scheme it uses more message communication and 
therefore is costly as shown in Figure 9. On the other hand LH and LNH scheme use less 
message transmission to find the common pairwise key and perform slightly better than 
USKS scheme but much better in comparison to ECPKS scheme.  
Both LH and LNH schemes perform similarly during the data transmission experiment.  
5.2 Data Storage Analysis 
        Figure 10 and 11 shows the cost of storage of key ring sets in the memory. Since key 
ring sets are used to generate pairwise keys, they are kept in the program + data memory 
of the node. For values of N = 4900-5000, key ring set storage requirements for EG 
scheme is more than 128 kilobytes, thus making it completely insignificant in terms of 
usage for most of the contemporary sensor nodes, including the popular Mica series, 
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IMotes and Telos sensors (except high end sensors like Sun SPOTS [28, 29], which has 
512 kilobytes of RAM). Q-Composite scheme performs better than Random pairwise 
scheme for large values of N.  It still takes more memory as compared to our LH scheme 
(14 kilobytes in Q-Composite as compared to approximately 2.5 kilobytes in our LH 
scheme for N=10000). During deployment of sensors in LNH scheme, the location 
information, sensor id information and the unique individual keys of every sensor nodes 
are stored into the head node in a secure manner. This causes the scheme to perform 
worse than the LH and Random pairwise scheme but better than Q-Composite and EG 
scheme. The LH scheme performs best in terms of data transmission.  
 
Figure 10. Memory Storage comparison of EG, Random pairwise, Q-Composite, AP with 
LH and LNH schemes 
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Figure 11. Memory Storage comparison of ECPKS, USKS, LH and LNH schemes. 
        In Figure 11 we have shown the memory storage comparison between ECPKS, 
USKS, LH and LNH schemes. During deployment the set up server selects a set S1 of n 
sensor nodes whose expected locations are closest to any node a. Now if all the nodes 
want to communicate between themselves they are required to have a common pairwise 
key between themselves. So for each node b in S1 set up server stores n key-plus-id 
combination ( kab, ida) into b’s key ring and also n key-plus-id combination ( kab, idb) into 
a’s key ring. This type of setup leaves very small memory left to be used as application in 
sensor devices such as smart dust sensor which has only 8 K bytes of program memory 
and 512 bytes of data memory. Also in USKS scheme before deployment the set up 
server stores ids, master keys, n key plus id combination KHi, uj, iduj (key and id 
combination of H and L sensors respectively) and the polynomial share of all H sensor to 
each H sensor. Also each L sensor are loaded with its own id, master key and l key plus 
id combination Ku, vj = PRF MKvj(idu) where u and v are L sensors, MKvj is the master key of 
any sensor vj and idu is the id of sensor u. Though USKS works better than ECPKS but 
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our schemes LH and LNH performs best in terms of memory storage as shown in Figure 
11.  
 5.3 Security Analysis 
        In this section we compare security against sensor node capture of our schemes with 
that for the existing schemes. 
        We compare our scheme LH and LNH with EG scheme, Q-Composite Scheme, 
Random Pairwise Scheme, AP scheme, ECPKS scheme, CPPS and CPKS scheme. Here 
we consider a scenario where 100 regular sensor nodes have been captured in a network 
and we keep on increasing the size of the network by 100 more captured nodes. The 
resilience against node capture attack of a key establishment scheme is measured by 
estimating the fraction of total secure communications that are compromised by a capture 
of c nodes not including the communication in which the compromised nodes are directly 
involved. For example, for any two non-compromised sensor nodes a and b, we have to 
find out what is the probability that the adversary can decrypt the secret communications 
between a and b when c sensor nodes are already compromised. If Pe(c) denotes the 
fraction of total secure communications compromised after capturing c sensor nodes by 
an attacker in a sensor network and if Pe(c) = 0, we call a key establishment scheme as 
unconditionally secure against node capture or perfectly resilient against node capture. 
We can see from the figure 12 that even with a small number of c captured nodes, EG 
scheme reveal a large fraction of total secure communications between non-compromised 
sensor nodes in the network.  
        The security of CPPS scheme shows that it performs well as long as number of 
captured nodes is small but as more number of nodes is captured CPPS scheme works 
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less better. ECPKS scheme performs better than CPPS scheme in terms of certain fraction 
of revelation of secure communication links between non compromised nodes. Only 
CPKS, LH and LNH provide unconditional security against regular node capture attacks. 
We have assumed H nodes (cluster head) are equipped with tamper-resistant technology 
[36]. For a network of 1000 nodes we need only 10 tamper resistant H nodes assuming 
we have 100 nodes in a cluster. It is reasonable to assume that powerful H nodes are 
equipped with this technology.  
 
Figure 12. Security Analysis of EG, CPKS, CPPS, ECPKS with LH and LNH schemes. 
        However for H nodes to be not tamper resident the attacker can get valuable sensor 
node information such as hashing function, location information etc. Therefore it can 
generate individual sensor keys inside a single cluster and can compromise the 
communication between two regular sensors by XORing the various possible 
combinations of individual sensor keys. Our future work will be in this area of providing 
unconditionally security to H nodes. However we have a better tradeoff between security 
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vs. transmission and storage cost of our schemes with all other current schemes. We 
outperform most other schemes in this area. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
        In this work we have developed a unicast based pairwise key generation and 
distribution scheme. A prominent feature in the key generation process includes 
generation of one way hash key chains and use of location information which adds to the 
security of our scheme. Broadcast and storage of key ring sets have been avoided (due to 
the inherent feature of unreliability of data broadcast in sensor nodes) unlike other 
schemes. This idea has led to significant reduction of cost in terms of transmission and 
storage. 
        We have used location information of sensor nodes for key generation which is a 
metric unique to each sensor node. The scheme performs well irrespective of network 
size because there is less communications among nodes which is less susceptible to 
eavesdropping. Our scheme is robust and in the event of an eavesdropping, the encrypted 
messages cannot be decrypted. Right now we assume that head nodes in our network are 
tamper resistant devices and cannot be compromised. In future we intend to develop a 
prototype for health care management that will address secure communication of medical 
data between medical sensors and handheld device of mobile patient called personal 
wireless hub (PWH) inside a wireless body sensor network (WBSN) using unicast based 
LH and LNH schemes. 
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